agency compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. Additional constitutional challenges are also likely. 5 Legal challenges against the implementation of large regulatory statutes are inevitable.
Two decades after the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments were adopted legal challenges to implementing regulations continue to be heard in federal court. 6 The PPACA is likely to spur even greater amounts of litigation. Health care represents nearly one-seventh of the domestic economy. Any effort to reform this sector necessarily creates winners and losers. With so much money on the table, litigation is inevitable as various interest groups seek to protect their gains, recapture losses or seek out new rents within the PPACA's health care regime.
The economic incentives for additional litigation are substantial, but economic interests will not be the only driver of PPACA litigation. Even after the NFIB decision the law remains unpopular with a substantial portion of the public and many Republican politicians are still clamoring for repeal. Ideological objections and partisan opposition to the law fuel litigation beyond that which might be economically justified. Republican state attorneys general along with conservative and libertarian public interest groups continue to seek opportunities to hamper full implementation of "ObamaCare." NFIB did little to quell the broader political debate over the PPACA.
Health care reform is inherently more controversial and divisive than many other sorts of large-scale administrative reform efforts. Health care reform inevitably tranches on matters of deep ethical and personal concern for many Americans. 7 Government decisions to pay for or subsidize some forms of health care and restrict others necessarily implicate contested questions of medical ethics and broader normative debates within society about nature of life, the importance of individual autonomy, and the role of government in promoting public health and particular visions of individual freedom. This is most apparent in the context of reproductive healthcare and end-of-life decisions, but permeates much of health care policy. Even seemingly technical questions about the comparative cost-effectiveness of various procedures necessarily implicates these broader ethical debates. As a consequence, health care reforms stir the passions and ignite ideological opposition in a way that policy initiatives in many other areas do not -and much of this passion will be channeled into the courts. An increasing array of public interest legal groups across the political spectrum stand ready to file legal challenges on behalf of various political, moral and religious causes.
The PPACA's scope and complexity also make it particularly vulnerable to legal challenge. Such vulnerabilities were compounded by the unusual circumstances surrounding its passage, and the need to resort to the budget reconciliation process -as opposed to a HouseSenate conference -to iron out legislative language. The law was rushed to the President's desk without benefit of the usual review and revision processes that can smooth a statute's rough edges. Many members also voted on the bill without being fully aware of all that it contained.
Two different reform bills initially emerged from the legislature. election in Massachusetts to replace Edward Kennedy in the Senate, thus depriving Democrats of a filibuster-proof majority. This forced health care reform proponents to abandon their efforts to craft a conference bill. Enacting the PPACA required taking a less-traveled path.
Lacking a sixty-vote margin in the Senate, reform proponents' options were limited. The only way to get a bill to the President's desk was for the House to pass the bill that had already passed the Senate -the PPACA -and then amend it as much as would be allowed under the budget reconciliation process. Reconciliation only requires a majority vote to pass the Senate, but may be used only for budget-related measures. This limited the range of amendments that could be offered and constrained last-minute efforts to "fix" the legislation. As reform advocates noted at the time, this presented a difficult choice: Enact a flawed bill with many imperfections or risk enacting no bill at all. 8 In this case passing a flawed bill meant enacting a PPACA that would be less effective at expanding health insurance coverage or controlling health care costs than its proponents had hoped. Yet that was the choice reform proponents ultimately embraced even though, as one health law expert noted later, it meant enacting a law that no one had intended to become law. 9 As a consequence, the PPACA would prove difficult to implement and particularly vulnerable to legal challenge. 14 In this respect, the PPACA embodies the sort of "cooperative federalism" common in many federal programs, from environmental regulation to Medicaid.
Insurance Exchanges and the Consequence of Omission

15
As written, the PPACA provides generous tax credits and subsidies to low and middle income individuals and families for the purchase of qualifying health insurance plans in state-run exchanges. Specifically, the Act offers refundable "premium assistance" tax credits to households with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).
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These tax credits are refundable, which means that if the credit is larger than a taxpayer's tax obligations, the taxpayer is eligible for a refund. The Act further offers "cost-sharing" subsidies to help low-income individuals and families obtain more than the minimum level of coverage at 13 See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2602 ("Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal polices. But when 'pressure turns into compulsion,' the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism." (citation omitted)).
14 See 42 U.S.C. §18041(c)(I).
15 New York, 505 U.S. at 167 ("where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation . . . This arrangement . . . has been termed "a program of cooperative federalism."). 16 See 26 U.S.C. § 36B. The textual limitation of tax credits to state-established exchanges has implications beyond the affordability of health insurance. Under Section 1513 of the PPACA employers with more than 50 full-time employees are required to offer "minimum essential coverage" to their employees. 20 Failure to offer such insurance can subject employers to a $2,000 fine for every full-time employee beyond the first 30 employees. 21 Significantly, this penalty is triggered when an employee becomes eligible for tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies by obtaining a qualifying health insurance plan through a state-run exchange. In effect, the penalty is designed to help offset the federal government's cost of providing tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies and prevent employers from dropping employee health insurance coverage due to the availability of subsidized insurance in exchanges. Yet if tax credits are unavailable in a given state, due to the lack of a state-run exchange, employers in that state will not face penalties for failing to offer qualifying health insurance.
DRAFT -Not for Citation
20 26 U.S.C. §4980H. 21 The PPACA provides, in the alternative, that if an employer provides "minimum value" insurance coverage that is not "affordable," the employer is fined $3,000 per employee that receives tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies or $2,000 per employee after the first 30 employees, whichever is less. The statutory language of section 36B and other provisions of the Affordable Care Act support the interpretation that credits are available to taxpayers who obtain coverage through a State Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and the Federallyfacilitated Exchange. Moreover, the relevant legislative history does not demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the premium tax credit to State Exchanges. Accordingly, the final regulations maintain the rule in the proposed regulations because it is consistent with the language, purpose, and structure of section 36B and the Affordable Care Act as a whole.
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No other explanation was offered in the Federal Register. Although commentators had argued that the express language of the PPACA limits the availability of the premium tax credits to those who enroll in qualifying health insurance plans through an Exchange established by a state under section 1311, the IRS did not identify any statutory language or legislative history to the contrary when it finalized the rule.
Pressed by members of Congress to offer a more complete justification for its rule authorizing tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies outside of state-created exchanges, the The fate of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies in states without state-run exchanges will ultimately be decided in federal court. In September 2012, the state of Oklahoma filed suit challenging the IRS rule on both substantive statutory and procedural grounds. The suit alleges the IRS rule conflicts with the plain language of the PPACA and that the IRS failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when promulgating the rule. Oklahoma's suit was subsequently joined by private employers seeking to free themselves of the employer mandate and, as of this writing, it appears that additional challenges to the IRS rule are likely.
The federal government may be able to delay legal challenges to the IRS rule, relying upon the Anti-Injunction Act or citing ripeness concerns, but it will not be easy to forestall these claims indefinitely. As a general rule, taxpayers lack standing to challenge the misuse of federal funds or preferential tax treatment given to others. Were tax credits and premium assistance the only consequence of the IRS rule, there would be no viable litigation. Yet because the availability of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies triggers the imposition of penalties to enforce the employer mandate, employers in applicable states should have standing to sue provided they are threatened by these penalties.
Some individuals in states with federal exchanges may be able to challenge the IRS rule as well, alleging injury due to the effect the authorization of tax credits and cost-sharing would individual who lives in a state that will not establish an Exchange by 2014 and that would otherwise qualify for the affordability exemption in the absence of tax credits would have standing to challenge the rule, provided that they earn between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level, do not receive health insurance from their employer, and would be exposed to the tax penalty due to the availability of tax credits under the IRS rule. Several million Americans satisfy these criteria. Many taxpayers will also suffer injury because the IRS rule will deprive them of the ability to purchase a low-cost "catastrophic" plan, which the law makes available to those over age 30 who qualify for the affordability exemption. Given continued opposition to the implementation of "ObamaCare," it seems quite likely that at least a few of these taxpayers will sue.
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The creation of health insurance exchanges is one of the central features of the PPACA.
Yet given the way the statute is written, and the manner in which many states have responded, it
Page 23 could be difficult for these exchanges to operate in the way that many had hoped. No less significant, the operation of health insurance exchanges, and the availability of tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies in states that refuse to cooperate with the PPACA, is a question that will be ultimately decided by the federal courts.
Conflict Over the Contraception Mandate
Challenges to the IRS rule purporting to authorize tax credits and cost sharing subsidies in federal exchanges may be among the most consequential for the ultimate operation of the PPACA, but they may not be the legal challenges that evoke the most popular concern. People care deeply about their health care. And some people care even more deeply about health care policy when it touches upon questions of sexual morality and reproductive health. Thus of all the decisions implementing the PPACA HHS has made thus far, none have been as controversial as the decision that employer health insurance plans must cover all forms of federally approved contraception, including sterilization and medications that can act as abortifacients. None have been more litigated either. As of 2013, more than fifty separate lawsuits had been filed challenging the so-called contraception mandate.
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Under Section 1001 of the PPACA, non-grandfathered group health plans are required to cover certain preventative health care services, and in particular preventative health care services for women, without any co-payments or other cost-sharing by the insured. 45 As implemented by HHS, this requirement was interpreted to apply to all contraception methods that have been 44 See http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral. 45 See 42 U.S.C. §300gg-13(a) approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 46 Somewhat controversially, such approved contraception methods include sterilization and some forms of contraception than can prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg or otherwise act as an abortifacient (such as intrauterine devices and the so-called "morning after" pill). Such forms of contraception are opposed by some religious groups. The official doctrine of the Catholic Church, for example, prohibits the use of all such forms of contraception. Many Evangelical churches also oppose the use of abortifacients or contraceptive methods that they believe will terminate unborn human life.
Failure to comply with the requirement subjects religious employers to substantial liability, however. Specifically, non-exempt employers are subject to a fine of $100 per employee, per day they fail to provide the required coverage.
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In response to religious objections, HHS created a narrow exemption for religious institutions. As promulgated by the Department, churches and other religious entities would be exempt should they meet the following four criteria:
1) The organization's purpose is the inculcation of religious values;
2) The organization primarily employs individuals who subscribe to the religious tenets of the organization;
3) The organization primarily serves individuals who subscribe to the religious tenets of the organization; and 4) The organization is a nonprofit. This exemption did not quiet the controversy over the contraception mandate, however. Under these criteria, many religious institutions, including religiously affiliated schools, universities, hospitals, and social service organizations, would be required to provide insurance that covers contraception methods that are contrary to their religious beliefs. As the head of Catholic
Charities USA quipped, "the ministry of Jesus Christ himself" would not qualify under HHS's criteria. 49 Some private, for-profit corporations owned by religious individuals objected as well.
HHS tried again to placate religious objections by announcing a one-year enforcement safe harbor and promising to adopt yet another accommodation for religious institutions. 50 One proposed accommodation suggested by HHS was to relieve religiously affiliated nonprofit employers from the obligation to provide insurance that covers all FDA-approved contraception methods and, instead, place the obligation to provide contraception coverage directly on insurers.
So, for example, if a Catholic hospital objected to contraception coverage, it would no longer have to pay for insurance coverage that covered such contraception. The insurer with which the hospital contracted, however, would be required to provide contraception at no charge to either the employer or the insured. Even assuming that HHS has the legal authority under the PPACA to impose such a requirement, it would not solve the problem because many religiously affiliated employers self-insure. 51 In such cases, the employer and the insurer are one and the same, so the suggested accommodation would not, in fact, ameliorate the religious employers' concerns.
HHS faces two additional problems in that a) this accommodation would not purport to do anything for privately owned, for-profit employers with owners who object to providing such contraception coverage on religious grounds, and b) should HHS back off its initial commitment to ensuring that group insurance plans cover contraception, it would face a new set of objections from reproductive health advocates.
Facing the prospect of having to pay for or otherwise provide health insurance coverage to which they object on religious grounds, numerous religious institutions and employers filed suit against the contraception mandate on both constitutional and statutory grounds. Specifically, they alleged that the contraception mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and, more ambitiously, the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
The strongest legal argument against the contraception mandate is statutory, not constitutional. Under current doctrine, the First Amendment does not pose much of an obstacle to a general law of neutral application, even if it requires some individuals to engage in actions prohibited by, or refrain from actions compelled by, their religious faith. 52 RFRA, however, presents a larger hurdle for the federal government. Under RFRA, the federal government may not adopt a policy that imposes a substantial burden on a person's religious faith unless that policy represents the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, this means that policies that are fully constitutional under the First Amendment are nonetheless barred under federal law. Moreover, by its express terms, RFRA applies to subsequently enacted legislation, so it governs the implementation of the PPACA.
In defense of the contraception mandate, the federal government has argued that requiring group insurance plans to cover FDA-approved contraception methods does not 52 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) . 53 See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb et seq..
represent a substantial burden on the practice of anyone's religion because the connection between the religious employer and the use of the contraception methods to which they object is sufficiently attenuated. Setting aside those religious employers that self-insure, the employer is not required to pay for or arrange for contraception because such contraception is only obtained and used as a result of independent choices made by the insured, the insured's doctor, and the insurance company. Religious employers counter that their objection is to the requirement that they cover such contraception, not that it may be later purchased or used. Lurking in the background of this debate is the question of whether the government (and the courts) must defer to a religious institution's own conception of what does or does not impose a substantial burden on religious practice.
Assuming that the contraception mandate does impose a substantial burden on religious exercise, defenders of the mandate contend it is nonetheless permissible because requiring coverage of FDA-approved contraception advances the compelling state interest in advancing gender equality and protecting women's health. 54 These government interests may well qualify as compelling under current doctrine. The government has also challenged the ability of private, for-profit employers to avail themselves of RFRA's protections at all.
The biggest problem for the federal government's position is RFRA's requirement that any burden on religious practice be narrowly tailored and no more restrictive than necessary to advance its asserted interest. 55 Those challenging the contraception mandate note that many group health plans -those grandfathered under the law or those offered by smaller employers --are not subject to the mandate. A consequence of this exception is that even with the mandate, 54 millions of individuals will have health insurance that does not cover contraception. Further, opponents argue that the federal government has other ways of expanding access to contraception that would be more effective and impose less of a burden on religious employers.
As 
Constitutional Constraints on Controlling Costs
Much of the PPACA seeks to expand health insurance coverage. The other major goal of health care reform was to tamp down on rising health care costs. Medical inflation has exceeded overall inflation for most of the past few decades and the cost of Medicare, in particular, has become a major budgetary concern, deemed "unsustainable" by the General Accounting
Office.
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The PPACA's primary cost-control measure is the Independent Accounting Oversight Board (IPAB), a new independent agency tasked to "reduce the per capita rate of growth in PPACA provides that Congress must enact alternative measures by August of the same year that will generate equivalent cost savings.
There is nothing at all unusual about delegating an executive or independent agency the authority to adopt policy measures with the force of law. Yet such authority is typically subject to various procedural requirements, such as those provided under the Administrative Procedure
Act for notice-and-comment rulemaking, and is subject to judicial review. Neither is the case with the IPAB. The PPACA imposes no meaningful administrative procedures on the Board and expressly precludes judicial review of IPAB actions and subsequent HHS implementation. 66 The result is the lack of any meaningful checks should the IPAB exceed the scope of its delegated authority.
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Where Congress disapproves of specific agency action, regular legislation satisfying the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment is sufficient to undo the agency's work. Again, the IPAB is different, as the PPACA requires a three-fifths vote in the Senate to waive the requirement that cost-control measures be adopted each year Medicare cost increases exceed the stated target. The PPACA also purports to hamstring Congress's ability to revise the law to alter or eliminate the IPAB. Specifically, the PPACA provides that a Joint Resolution to repeal the IPAB provisions can only be introduced in January 2017, is subject to special rules 66 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(e)(5). 67 As one commentator notes:
What is happening here is truly remarkable. Congress is delegating to HHS authority to waive the provisions of existing law, freeing it from judicial oversight and, in the case of the IPAB, even limiting Congress's own authority to override the decisions of an executive agency."
Jost, Real Constitutional Problem, at 503.
governing floor consideration and debate, and can only be enacted by a three-fifths supermajority in both houses. likely to forego obtaining insurance as a result. 74 After the NFIB decision, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that approximately six million Americans (of an estimated 30 million who would remain uninsured) will be required to pay the penalty in 2016. 75 The most obvious way to address this concern, and prevent adverse selection, would be to increase the penalty to amount until it was comparable with the out-of-pocket cost of a qualifying health insurance plan. At this point low-risk individuals would have little incentive to forego health insurance. The problem here is that were Congress to increase the penalty substantially, it might no longer qualify as a tax. The relatively small amount uninsured individuals would be required to pay the government as a consequence of being uninsured was one of the primary factors that led Chief Justice Roberts to include the payment constituted a tax. 76 A payment that equaled or exceeded the cost of obtaining insurance, on the other hand, could resemble the sort of "'prohibitory' financial punishment" that would exceed the scope of the taxing power. 77 While it is permissible to use a tax to "influence behavior," Chief Justice Roberts explained, for an assessment to be a "tax," and not an unconstitutional penalty or mandate, it must leave an individual with a meaningful choice and not become "so punitive" that it begins to resemble a punishment or a mandate. 78 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion would seem to prohibit Congress from increasing the size of the tax penalty by any sizable degree, virtually assuring that the minimum coverage requirement will not fulfill its intended purpose. 79 It also ensures that any increase in the mandate tax would be met with a fresh legal challenge. Absent the ability to increase the assessment on those without health insurance, Congress or the Administration may seek out other ways of discouraging adverse selection. According to some reports, health insurers are encouraging HHS to implement additional measures, such as late-enrollment fees or other requirements, so as to discourage adverse selection, particularly as the mandate is first phased in. 80 Should the Department seek to implement any such measures, however, legal challenges to its regulatory authority are equally likely.
Conclusion
Some expected and many hoped that the Supreme Court's resolution of the NFIB litigation would have put an end to the legal challenges to the PPACA. Yet it was never to be this way. The PPACA is too expansive and significant a statute, affecting too many economic interests and implicating too many political, moral and ideological divisions within the country for the litigators to stay their hand. As the federal government implements the law in the years to come, its choices will be scrutinized and challenged at every turn. As a consequence, the ultimate shape of health care reform will still be decided in federal court. 
